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1 
THE DUBITANTE OPINION 
Jason J. Czarnezki* 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. . . . 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. . . . MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE 
STEWART joins, concurring in the result. . . . MR. JUSTICE 
DOUGLAS, dubitante.1 
The 2004 Term of the United States Supreme Court resulted in 203 
full opinions written, including 61 concurrences and 63 dissents.2  
Judicial use of these three basic opinion types, the majority, concurring 
and dissenting opinions or variations thereof (e.g., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) has been the norm in the Court and lower federal 
courts over recent decades.  Yet, another type of opinion exists—the 
dubitante opinion.3 
Judges rarely write dubitante opinions or use the term, and informal 
polling suggests not many legal scholars are aware of the practice.4  This 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; A.B., J.D., University of Chicago. 
 1. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967). 
 2. The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 420 (Table 1). 
 3. I first learned of the dubitante opinion while doing research on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  See United States v. Zendeli, 180 F.3d 879, 887 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Ripple, J., dubitante).  The dubitante opinion is not a compiled category in the Harvard Law 
Review’s annual statistics on the Court.  See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1967 Term—The Statistics, 
82 HARV. L. REV. 301 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 103 (1965).  It is 
likely that dubitante opinions are counted as dissents or concurrences.  See The Supreme Court, 
1967 Term, supra, at 302 (crediting a Justice with a dissent or concurrence whenever writing 
separately). 
 4. At least one law student is aware of the term and has named his web log after it.  See 
Dubitante, http://www.dubitante.blogspot.com/2004/02/about-dubitante.html (last visited February 
1, 2004) (A 1L’s blog about law school and the distractions from it).  His own definition of the term 
might explain some judges’ desire to use the term—“For me, ‘Dubitante’ sums up my view of the 
world: extremely cynical, but a good sport about it.  I disagree with many things, but am usually 
willing to play along . . . .”  Some law professors have noted the odd term; their links have helped 
my investigation.  See ProfessorBainbridge.com, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2004/03/ 
bainbridge_j_du.html (last visited March 16, 2004); The Indiana Law Blog, 
http://www.indianalawblog.com/mt/archives/2004/03/ 000149.html (last visited March 15, 2004). 
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short Essay endeavors to shed some light on the use of the term 
dubitante in judicial opinions and spark discussion as to the merits of the 
dubitante opinion—What is a dubitante opinion?  When was the term 
first used, and how often is the term used?  Who uses it and how?  What 
are the consequences of its use? 
A dubitante (pronounced d[y]oo-bi-tan-tee) opinion indicates that 
“the judge doubted a legal point but was unwilling to state that it was 
wrong.”5  Said Lon Fuller, “[E]xpressing the epitome of the common 
law spirit, there is the opinion entered dubitante—the judge is unhappy 
about some aspect of the decision rendered, but cannot quite bring 
himself to record an open dissent.”6 
In the United States, the term has been used in only 626 written 
opinions.7  Clearly, concurrences, not dubitante opinions, are the norm 
when expressing reservations, but deciding to vote with the court’s 
majority.  However, the term is most frequently used to express doubt in 
general, not to define a judge’s disposition in a given case.  In colonial 
times, the term was first used to describe Judge Blair’s disposition in the 
case of Bernard v. Stonehouse, 2 Va. Colonial Dec. B60 (Va. Gen. Ct. 
1737).  It was used first in the new democracy by Maryland state court 
Judge Goldsborough in Fulton v. Wood, 3 H. & McH. 99, 100 (Md. 
1792).  The first federal court to use the term explained a concern of 
Judge Humphreys of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia (then known as the Supreme Court of the District of 
Columbia) in Tuohy v. Martin (1876).8  However, none of these cases 
describe the term or provide information on its origins, nor do the early 
English cases that use the term.  No English cases use the term prior to 
late 1700s cases written by American state court judges.9 
 
 5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 515 (7th ed. 1999).  See also DAVID M. WALKER, THE 
OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 379 (Oxford Univ. Press. 1980) (defining dubitante as “the 
term used in a law report of a judge who devotes a proposition of law but does not go so far as to 
repudiate it as bad or wrong”). 
 6. LON FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 147 (1968).  Cases have also quoted Fuller’s 
definition.  See, e.g., Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1151 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 7. Both LEXIS and Westlaw have cases that date back to the 1600s.  As of June 30, 2005, 
Westlaw shows 626 cases using the term dubitante, while LEXIS only shows 600. 
 8. 2 MacArth. 572, 577 (D.C. 1876) (“HUMPHREYS, J., expressed himself dubitante on 
one point, that is, whether any charge ought to be made upon Mrs. Martin’s devise until the 
exhaustion of the estate specially encumbered by the expense of the monument.”). 
 9. I found English cases from the early 1800s using the term.  See, e.g., Pitt v. Laming, 
(1814) 171 Eng. Rep. 24 (“Held: assuming that the condition was legal, as to which dubitante, the 
omission to make the endorsement within three months did not avoid the policy, and, therefore, 
there was no breach of the covenant to insure.”); Pelly v. Wathen, (1851) 42 Eng. Rep. 457 (using 
term to describe a judge’s disposition stating “KNIGHT-BRUCE, LJ, dubitante”).  Similar to the 
2
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Both American state and federal courts employ the term dubitante.  
Of the 626 total cases using the term, 269 are federal cases, twelve of 
those coming from the United States Supreme Court.  Needless to say, in 
examining the frequency of its use, mere citation hits do not paint an 
accurate picture.  While the Supreme Court may have written the word 
dubitante twelve times, only four times was it in reference to a Justice’s 
disposition in the case at issue (i.e., a dubitante opinion), as opposed as a 
phrase used in the text to express reservations about a specific issue or 
fact rather than the majority’s entire opinion.10  Of the 269 federal cases, 
most are not dubitante opinions (this includes 69 district court cases and 
134 appellate decisions). 
Over one-third of these textual uses of the term (i.e., not dubitante 
opinions) can be attributed to the First Circuit, and, more specifically, 
Judges Sandra L. Lynch and Michael Boudin, who account for over 
three-quarters of the First Circuit’s use.  In other words, these two judges 
account for nearly 20% of all uses of the term ever, not just in the 
dispositional context, in the history of the United States federal 
judiciary.11  These two judges are especially likely to use the term when 
assuming a condition or fact that they otherwise might question.12  
However, that still leaves 66 cases from the courts of appeals where 
dubitante is used in reference to a judge’s disposition in the case at issue 
or in another appellate case. 
Amazingly, nearly one-half of these citations to dubitante opinions 
can be attributed to only four fairly well-known judges—Frank M. 
Coffin (First Circuit); Henry J. Friendly (Second Circuit); Frank H. 
Easterbrook (Seventh Circuit); and James C. Hill (Eleventh Circuit).  
 
United States, I also note that the term is not routinely used in English courts. 
 10. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 403 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
dubitante); O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., 380 U.S. 359, 371 (1965) (Douglas, J., 
dubitante); Radio Corp. of Am. v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 421 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
dubitante); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (“MR. JUSTICE 
RUTLEDGE acquiesces in the Court’s opinion and judgment, dubitante on the question of equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
 11. In fact, this figure is underestimated because Judges Lynch and Boudin were both 
members of a number of panels that filed per curiam opinions where the term was used. 
 12. See, e.g., Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 56 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Thus, without using the 
burden-shifting model, we simply assume dubitante that the evidence Lesley has put forward is 
sufficient to require us to consider Dr. Chie’s reasons for his referral.”); Reed v. Lepage Bakeries, 
Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 262 (1st Cir. 2001) (“In any event, even were we to assume dubitante that Reed 
adequately requested an accommodation allowing her to walk away from conflicts with supervisors, 
Reed was never prevented from exercising such accommodation during her June 1, 1996 meeting 
with Callahan.”); United States v. Brady, 168 F.3d 574, 580 (1st Cir. 1999) (“But a significant 
purpose to obstruct is enough, even if we assume dubitante that a pure desire not to rat would avoid 
the obstruction charge.”). 
3
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These opinions reveal that Judge Hill, whose dubitante opinions account 
for most of these citations, uses the term dubitante in a manner 
synonymous with any level of disagreement with the majority opinion.  
For example, his opinions often begin “HILL, J., dissenting dubitante”13 
or “HILL, J., concurring dubitante.”14 
The same cannot be said of the other three judges.  The term 
dubitante can best be seen as a level of agreement between fully joining 
the majority opinion and a concurrence.15  In other words, the judge can 
be seen as agreeing with the rationale in the majority opinion, but having 
reservations about the very same rationale.  For example, Judge 
Easterbrook, in Majors v. Abell, explains, “Given McConnell, I cannot 
be confident that my colleagues are wrong in thinking that five Justices 
will go along.  But I also do not understand how that position can be 
reconciled with established principles of constitutional law.”16 
In Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., Judge Friendly expresses 
doubt by stating, “Although intuition tells me that the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut would not sustain the award made here, I cannot prove it.  I 
therefore go along with the majority, although with the gravest 
doubts.”17  Judge Frank Coffin, in Kartell v. Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts, Inc., laments, “While I share the court’s desire to defer 
to the Massachusetts courts for all the help we can get, and feel its 
resolution makes sense, I confess to some uneasiness about our privilege 
as an appellate court simply to abstain when the district court has not 
seen fit to do so.”18  In using the unusual term dubitante to describe their 
 
 13. See, e.g., Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. United States, 37 F.3d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(Hill, J., dissenting dubitante). 
 14. See, e.g., In re Alvarez, 224 F.3d 1273, 120 (11th Cir. 2000) (Hill, J., concurring 
dubitante). 
 15. There are at least five other levels of judicial (dis)agreement—(1) when two judges sign 
the same opinion without any separate opinions, regardless of who wrote the opinion; (2) when a 
judge concurs with another judge’s opinion; (3) when a judge concurs in part and dissents in part; 
(4) when a judge concurs only in the judgment of the other judge’s opinion; and (5) full 
disagreement, where a judge dissents from a majority opinion.  See Jason J. Czarnezki & William 
K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, UNIV. OF 
CHI., PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 102 (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=773865. 
 16. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 358 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).  See also 
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 685 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., 
dubitante) (“Still, I am not so sure as my colleagues that § 18 preempts state rules.”). 
 17. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J., 
dubitante). 
 18. Kartell, v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1195 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(Coffin, J., dubitante), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part by, Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984).  See also Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 9 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (Coffin, J., dubitante) (“I respectfully question whether the district court properly granted 
summary judgment on the issue of the Bank’s malice.”); In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901, 904 (1st Cir. 
4
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opinions, these three judges have lived up to their reputations as scholars 
most interested in language, vocabulary, and the meaning of words.  
After all, Easterbrook often cites to Wittgenstein,19 Coffin wrote the 
book A Lexicon for Oral Advocacy (1985), and Friendly once asked, 
“[W]hat is a chicken?”20 
Upon initial analysis, one might conclude that there are several 
advantages to dubitante opinions.  A dubitante opinion provides a more 
nuanced description of an individual judge’s level of concern with the 
case’s disposition.  Thus, these opinions can serve as a signal to lawyers 
that a better, but not yet conceived, legal argument may exist.  Dubitante 
opinions can also be brief and do not connote a high level of 
disagreement with fellow judges.  In fact, a judge can join a majority 
opinion dubitante without a writing.  (This seems to have been the 
historical tradition.)  Therefore, judges need not use significant amounts 
of time and will not hamper judicial collegiality in writing these 
opinions, while at the same time providing more robust information to 
the legal community.  However, while dubitante opinions offer 
efficiency and intellectual advantages, they may also create substantial 
difficulties, or at least uncertainties, in practice. 
In an analysis of dubitante opinions in the context of Florida 
Supreme Court use, concerns are raised about writing dubitante 
 
1974) (Coffin, C.J., dubitante) (“While I cannot, with conviction, fault the court’s reasoning, neither 
can I say that it rests comfortably with the clear indication that Congress was deeply interested in 
requiring strict accountability of the Attorney General for such technological invasions of privacy as 
he may deem necessary.”), vacated by, Marcus v. United States, 417 U.S. 942 (1974). 
 19. Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union Pension 
Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987)) 
(“You don’t have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful 
communication depends on meanings shared by interpretive communities.”); Stevens v. Tillman, 
855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE 
LANGUAGE 8-24 (1982)). 
 20. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B. N. S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960). Judge Friendly stated: 
The issue is, what is chicken? Plaintiff says ‘chicken’ means a young chicken, suitable 
for broiling and frying. Defendant says ‘chicken’ means any bird of that genus that meets 
contract specifications on weight and quality, including what it calls ‘stewing chicken’ 
and plaintiff pejoratively terms ‘fowl’. Dictionaries give both meanings, as well as some 
others not relevant here. To support its, plaintiff sends a number of volleys over the net; 
defendant essays to return them and adds a few serves of its own. Assuming that both 
parties were acting in good faith, the case nicely illustrates Holmes’ remark ‘that the 
making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on 
the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the parties’ having meant the same 
thing but on their having said the same thing.’ The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal 
Papers, p. 178. I have concluded that plaintiff has not sustained its burden of persuasion 
that the contract used ‘chicken’ in the narrower sense. 
Id. 
5
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opinions.21  For example, if a judge writes a dubitante opinion, without 
stating “concurring dubitante,” can this judge’s vote automatically be 
relied upon as the second (in the courts of appeals), fourth (in many state 
supreme courts) or fifth vote (in the U.S. Supreme Court) needed to 
create a binding decision?22  Even if the answer if yes, to what extent is 
the precedential value diminished because it is unclear whether this 
majority, including the judge filing the dubitante opinion, agreed on the 
same rationale for the decision?23 
While issuance of a dubitante opinion by a judge expresses 
reservations with the majority’s holding, the dubitante opinion 
nevertheless, by design, also indicates a judge’s (possibly reluctant) 
agreement with the majority’s rationale.24  Thus, an opinion issued 
dubitante should be considered to represent a vote with the majority and 
does become binding precedent (i.e., not a plurality) where the dubitante 
opinion is the deciding vote.25  However, for a court of last resort, where 
a dubitante opinion was needed to create the majority, the opinion may 
be a candidate for reversal (because the dubitante opinion calls out for a 
better legal argument to be made).26 
 
 21. Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida 
Supreme Court, 18 NOVA. L. REV. 1151, 1176-77 (1994).  This article has since been updated.  See 
Harry Lee Anstead, Gerald Kogan, Thomas D. Hall, and Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida (2005), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/ 
documents/juris.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2005).  Only limited definitions and commentaries are 
offered in other secondary sources.  See, e.g., Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The 
History of the Supreme Court’s Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 530 (2000) 
(stating that dubitante signals “that even a Justice who doubts his own tentative position is more 
inclined to express it in writing than to join a supposedly clear-cut opinion”); B. Rudolph Delson, 
Note, Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting Protocols, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
1203, 1205 n.12 (2001) (considering dubitante opinions to be a type of dissent). 
 22. See Kogan & Waters, supra note 21, at 1177. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 403 (1967) (Douglas, 
J., dubitante) (questioning the scope of the majority’s holding); Radio Corp. of Am. v. United 
States., 341 U.S. 412, 421 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dubitante) (“Since I am not alone in entertaining 
doubts about this case they had better be stated.”).  See also supra notes 16-18 & accompanying 
text.  Contra Anstead, Kogan, Hall, and Waters, supra note 21, at 33 (arguing that there must be 
“clear” agreement for the majority’s rationale). 
 25. My understanding of the word does represent a slight disagreement with the definition of 
Kogan & Waters.  See Kogan & Waters, supra note 21, at 1177 (citing In re Constitutionality of 
Senate Joint Resolution 2G, 601 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla. 1992) (“However, there also seem to be times 
when an opinion marked merely ‘dubitante’ is neither a dissent nor a concurrence, but an expression 
of doubts so grave that the judge or justice can neither agree nor disagree with the majority.  This 
probably is the best construction . . . .”)). 
 26. Perhaps this is the same as suggesting that a majority outcome requiring the dubitante 
opinion is entitled to “some diminished form of precedential value.”  Anstead, Kogan, Hall, and 
Waters, supra note 21, at 33. 
6
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This construction of the dubitante opinion gives the judicial tool a 
unique definition separate from a concurrence, avoids the confusion 
often caused by plurality opinions,27 and promotes judicial efficiency by 
providing lower courts with binding precedent to follow.  If this is not a 
accurate characterization of a judge’s view of the case’s outcome or 
authority, and in most cases it is not, the judge should describe his or her 
disposition as “concurring” on slightly different grounds, or merely 
“concurring in the judgment” elaborating on his or her differing rationale 
from the majority opinion. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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